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FEMINISM AND CHILD CUSTODY UNDER CHAPTER TWO OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION
MARGARET F. BRINIG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Chief Reporter of the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution wrote in his introduction; “Children are necessarily at the
heart of any set of principles of family law.”1  My favorite chapter of the
Principles is Chapter Two, entitled “Principles Governing the Allocation of
Custodial and Decisionmaking Responsibilities for Children.”2  As of this
writing, Chapter Two holds the distinction of being the only portion to have
been adopted by a state legislature.3  While other Chapters had Reporters who
were women,4 Chapter Two not only had a feminist Reporter,5 but the
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1. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Chief
Reporter’s Preface at xiii (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I, 1998) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1998].
2. The title of the chapter, which of course does not refer to “child custody,” represents a
conscious decision to “alternative language more accommodating to a continuum of residential
arrangements.”  ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.03, reporter’s notes at 53 (citing state statutes
with similar terminology).  The Comments to the Section note that “this substitution is intended to
avoid the either-or (custody or visitation) alternatives suggested by the more conventional
terminology,” while “the unified concept of custodial responsibility may help to strengthen the
notion that both parents share responsibility for the child, regardless of the proportion of time each
spends with the child, and that neither should be a mere “visitor.”  Id. § 2.03 cmts. a-b & d.  This
paper will further explore the themes of avoiding win-lose situations.
3. W. VA. CODE §§ 48-11-101-604 (Supp. 2000).  The Chief Reporter for the ALI Principles
project privately maintains that this chapter is the most likely to be adopted widely by state
legislatures, in part because it is not as integrated with other chapters as are the financial matters of
Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  Interview with Ira Mark Ellman (Jan. 4, 2001). Chapter 6 on Domestic
Partnership probably departs the most from current law since it mandates similar inter se allocations
of money as currently comes upon divorce of married couples.  ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1.
Section 6.05 of the Principles provides in part that “Domestic-partnership property should be divided
according to the principles set forth for the division of marital property.”  Id.  Section 6.06 provides
that except as otherwise provided, “(a) a domestic partners is entitled to compensatory payments on
the same basis as a spouse under Chapter 5.”  Id.  Chapter 7 of the Principles (1998) has much in
common with the UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B ULA 363 (1998), which has been
adopted in some 25 states and the District of Columbia since its appearance in 1979.  CARL E.
SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW; PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, AND
PERSPECTIVES 415 (2d ed. 2000).
4. Grace Ganz Blumberg was the Reporter for Chapters 3 and 6.  ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra
note 1.
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“allocation principle” that forms the substantive heart of the Chapter6 was also
credited to a woman.7  It should come as no surprise that feminist principles
permeate the Chapter.  The plan of this commentary is to first set forth those
characteristics that make Chapter Two distinctive, and then to discuss how these
characteristics relate to feminist principles.  Because this Chapter appeals to so
many women, those who influence public policy must prepared to demonstrate
that men’s interests will not be compromised by legislative adoption.  My
conclusion will offer some suggestions along these lines.
II.  THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF CHAPTER TWO
There are at least four ways, excluding terminology, in which Chapter Two
differs from standard custody legislation.8  First, Chapter Two emphasizes
parental agreement.9  Second—and what I call the “core”—is the setting of the
5. Katharine T. Bartlett was the Reporter for Chapter 2.  ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1.  She
is a recognized feminist scholar and has published such books as FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS
IN LAW AND GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett & Roseann Kennedy, eds., 1991); KATHARINE T. BARTLETT
& ANGELA  P. HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY (2d ed. 1998).
6. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.09 (sets the “default rule” when parents do not
otherwise agree).
7. Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615 (1992)
[hereinafter Scott, Pluralism].  Professor Scott also writes on themes important to feminist scholars.
See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1936,
1940-41, 1951, 1964-64 (2000) [hereinafter Scott, Social Norms] though she classifies herself as a liberal
as well as a feminist.  See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 687, 688-89:
I aim to defend liberalism as a framework for shaping family law policy. I argue that
communitarian concerns about the direction of family law are valid, but that many of
those concerns can be accommodated in a liberal framework. The problem is not the basic
principles that shape the liberal  framework, but their distorted expression in modern
family law. A liberal contractual framework supports binding commitment and fulfillment
of responsibility in family relations.
8. All state statues, regardless of what they require substantively, contain language that sets
the child’s “best interests” as most important.  Section 2.02(1), unsurprisingly, states that the
“primary objective of Chapter 2 is to serve the child’s best interests.” ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note
1, § 2.02(1).  The differences, then, lie in the procedural and substantive ways that “best interests” is
reached.  Of course, dissolution of parental relationships rarely advances the interests of the child.
PAUL A. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY
UPHEAVAL (1997) (suggesting that children are only better off if their parents had a highly conflictual
marriage before divorce, a case that occurs only about 30% of the time).  Some writers have
suggested a “least detrimental alternative” standard as being closer to matching what actually goes
on.  See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD  (1973).
9. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.02(1)(a) suggests that the best interests will be served
by facilitating “parental planning and agreement about the child’s custodial arrangements and
upbringing.”
Parenting plans and agreement are not new to custody legislation.  They represent the rule
in Montana, (MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-234(1) (1999)), Tennessee, (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-6-401 et
seq. (2000)) and Washington, (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.181(1)(West 1997)) and are under
consideration in many other states.  In fact, parental agreement is reached in the vast majority of
divorce cases.  The emphasis here is threefold: to place the onus on parents who must do actual
planning work on the “common text” of raising their children, to allow continued autonomy of
parents even when the state must be involved because of divorce, and to allow escape from judicial
discretion.  Jane W. Ellis, Plans, Protections, and Professional Intervention: Innovations in Divorce Custody
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default rule to an “approximation standard.”10  Third, Chapter Two enlarges the
concept of parenting beyond traditional biological and adoptive parents to
include parents by estoppel and de facto parents.11  Finally, although some cases
have purported to do so,12 Chapter Two makes clear that achieving fairness
Reform and the Role of Legal Professionals, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 65 (1990) (studying the Washington
legislation).
Any rule, even a bad one, will reduce litigation. Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev,
Trading at Divorce, Preferences, Legal Rules and Transaction Costs, 8 J. DISP. RESOL. 279 (1993).  The hard
work required on the parenting plan can conceivably encourage parents to place their children’s
interests first, albeit fleetingly, at a time when they are most inclined to think of their own interests.
It can reduce later litigation since according to the ADR literature, people are more likely to adhere
for the long run when they’ve worked out the contract itself (for example, when they “own” the
contract just as students are claimed to “own” the material after good use of the Socratic method).
Incidentally, some couples may be deterred from divorcing in the first place as they “consider their
children first.”  For example, in the early 1990s, faced with the highest divorce rates in recorded
history the British Government proposed a “back to basics” philosophy that would lengthen the
waiting period for divorce to twelve months, (eighteen months where there were minor children)
during which mediation and reflection would take place.  Michael D.A. Freeman, England in the
International Year of the Family, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 199 (Andrew Bainham
ed., 1994). This no-fault law was finally enacted by Parliament in July of 1996.  Because the
mediation and counseling provisions add substantial transaction costs and encourage reconciliation,
conservatives suggested that the divorce rate should first increase over the next several years, then
decrease. See Don’t kill the divorce bill, NEW STATESMAN AND SOCIETY, 5 (May 31, 1996); see also
Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393
(1998).  In some jurisdictions, courts may require parents to attend a parenting class or classes.
These jurisdictions are listed at ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.08 cmt. a, reporter’s notes at
97-98.  For examples of such legislation, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-69b(b) (1995); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.21(2) (1997); IOWA CODE § 598.19A (1996).  For some endorsements, see Peter Salem,
Education for Divorcing Parents: A New Direction for Family Courts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 837 (1995);
Katherine M. Kitzman & Robert E. Emery, Child and Family Coping One Year After Mediated and
Litigated Child Custody Dispute, 8 J. FAM. PSYCH. 150, 156-57 (1994).
10. The standard is set forth primarily in ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.09.  However,
section 2.02(b) foreshadows the standard, maintaining that the child’s best interests will be served by
facilitating “continuity of existing parent-child attachments.”  Id. §2.02(b).
11. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§
2.03(b) and (c)(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 2000].  I have discussed these
definitions at some length in Margaret F. Brinig, Troxel and the Limits of Community, RUTG. L.J.
(forthcoming 2001).  To the extent that many nontraditional families are female-headed, broadening
the definition of “parent” is also woman-friendly idea.  But some beneficiaries of this extension will
be men, such as stepparents and “fathers by estoppel.”  See ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.04,
reporter’s notes at 61.
12. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.02 cmt. b; see also McCreery v. McCreery, 237 S.E.2d
167 (Va. 1977); Dyer v. Howell, 184 S.E.2d 789 (Va. 1971).  However, the Supreme Court case of May
v. Anderson  refers to custody as a personal right no less important than property rights, which might
be thought of as promoting a “parent first” attitude.  345 U.S. 528 (1953); see also Judith T. Younger,
Marriage, Divorce, and the Family: A Cautionary Tale, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1367, 1380 (1993); Mary Ann
Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980’s, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553, 1559 (1984); Amitai Etzioni, Give
Couples Tools To Make Marriages Last, USA TODAY, Nov. 18,  1996, at 25A.  For a debate about the
wisdom of keeping troubled marriages together, see Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About
Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9 (1990), and Linda J. Lacey,  Mandatory  Marriage “For the Sake of
the Children”: A Feminist Reply to Elizabeth Scott, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1435, 1440-42 (1990); see also
Katherine T. Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1547 (1998).
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between the parents is an objective secondary to serving the child’s best
interests.13
III.  RELATING CHAPTER TWO TO THEMES OF FEMINIST THOUGHT
Chapter Two strikes the reader as very nuanced.  In contrast to such rules
as the “innocent parent rule,”14 the “maternal preference rule”15 or the “primary
caretaker presumption,”16 no parent becomes a sole custodian; no one is
relegated to visitation.17  Unlike Chapter Three, which can be difficult to
understand and its calculations difficult to implement,18 the ideas are familiar
ones.19  However, the idea that neither parent should emerge as a victor
following a custody determination presents a major change.20  Though fairness
takes a secondary role, in fact for most families, approximating the caretaking
each did before presents less of a change (and therefore a feeling that one has
13. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.02(2) (“A secondary objective of Chapter 2 is to
achieve fairness between the parents.”).
14. Mullen v. Mullen, 49 S.E.2d 349 (Va. 1948); Owens v. Owens, 31 S.E.2d 72, 74 (Va. 1898);
Jamil Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the
Courts, 1796-1851, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1038 (1979); see also Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody
Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 234 (1975).
15. See, e.g., J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248, 253 (W. Va. 1978).
From a strictly biological perspective, children of the suckling age are necessarily
accustomed to close, physical ties with their mothers, and young children, technically
weaned, are accustomed to the warmth, softness, and physical affection of the female
parent.  The welfare of the child seems to require that if at all possible we avoid subjecting
children to the trauma of being wrenched away from their mothers, upon whom they
have naturally both an emotional and physical dependency.  While a child is usually
emotionally dependent upon his father, he seldom has the same physical dependency
which he has upon his mother.
16. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985); Brooks v. Brooks, 466 A.2d 152 (Pa. Super.
1983); Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Garska v. McCoy,
278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).  For a discussion of why it was unsuccessful in Minnesota, see Gary
Crippen, Stumbling Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in
the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV.
427 (1990).
17. See, e.g., Robert E. Fay, M.D., The Disenfranchised Father, 36 ADV. IN PEDIA. 407 (1989); see also
Jerry McCant, The Cultural Contradiction of Fathers as Nonparents, 21 FAM. L.Q. 127 (1987).  See
generally John S. Murray, Improving Parent-Child Relationships Within the Divorced Family: A Call for
Legal Reform, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 563 (1986) (for an early justification of the replication or
approximation principle).
18. SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 3, at 1160, question 1.
19. As Elizabeth Scott notes, approximation standards do not require a quality judgment but
only a quantitative one.  Scott, Pluralism, supra note 7, at 637.
20. Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody In The 21st Century: How The American Law Institute
Proposes To Achieve Predictability And Still Protect The Individual Child’s Best Interests, 35 WILLIAMETTE
L. REV. 467, 480 (1999) notes:
In effect, it amounts to a primary caretaker presumption when one parent has been
exercising a substantial majority of the past caretaking, and it amounts to a joint custody
presumption when past caretaking has been shared equally in the past.  It responds to all
variations and combinations of past caretaking patterns between those two poles,
declining to impose some average, idealized family form on all families and instead
favoring solutions that roughly approximate the caretaking shares each parent assumed
before the divorce or before the custody issue arose.
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lost and the other won) than does the equal division21 mandated by many “joint
custody” awards.22
Perhaps more controversial from a feminist perspective,23 section 2.0224
declares that child welfare, or “the child’s best interests”25 takes precedence over
the “secondary objective”26 of “achieving fairness between the parents.”  The
comments to the section remark “when a family breaks up, children are usually
the most vulnerable parties and thus most in need of the law’s protection.”27
The comments go on to note, “Without confidence in the basic fairness of the
rules, parents are more likely to engage in strategic,28 resentful or uncooperative
behavior, from which children may suffer.”29  Though many women identify
21. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (1994) (when parents agree); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(a)(1997);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a(1) (1991)(findings required if joint custody not awarded).  For
some case examples, see Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63 (N.J. 1981); Murray v. Murray, 2000 WL 827960
(Tenn. App. 2000).
22. Scott Altman, Should Child Custody Rules Be Fair, 35 U. LOUISVILLE. J. FAM. L. 325, 353 (1996);
Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1595-96 (1991).
23. Martha Fineman presented a Feminist Theory Workshop at Cornell University in 1998
entitled Uncomfortable Conversations and brought together scholars interested in child welfare and
women’s rights.  The call for papers, on file with the author, put it as follows: “The first of these
uncomfortable conversations is going to be between “advocates for children” and “advocates for
mothers” (or “parents” for those of you who insist on gender neutrality).”  Martha Fineman, Call for
Papers, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS (1998).
24. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.02(2).
25. Id. § 2.02(1) (“The primary objective. . .”).
26. Id. § 2.02(2).
27. Id. § 2.02 cmt. b.  If we depoliticize this statement, it could reflect the same justification given
for awarding children of divorcing parents college educations while those of intact families are
entitled to none.  See In re Marriage of Crocker, 971 P.2d 469, 475-76 (Or. App. 1998); Kujawinski v.
Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1389-90 (Ill. 1978).  Alternatively, this preference for “child interests”
may be what economists call a “Kaldor-Hicks” adjustment since children are affected by their
parents’ activities. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 126-27 (2000).
28. I will take up this theme shortly.  Feminists argue that the “joint custody” standard
encourages strategic behavior because it does not reward past behavior and therefore requires
women to trade financial resources for the share of child time they would receive if the allocation
were fair.  Grillo, supra note 22, at 1595-96.  This concern is related to the strategic behavior
anticipated by Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser in Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).  When the outcome of litigation is uncertain, the parent who
will be penalized is the one with the greatest risk aversion. Mnookin and Kornhauser claim that
women are more risk averse, especially regarding the loss of their children, so their husbands can
exploit this reluctance to litigate and can thus extract a bigger share of the couple’s finances. These
concerns prompted the primary caretaker presumption in the first place.  Garska v. McCoy, 278
S.E.2d 357, 362-63 (W. Va. 1981); Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and
the Dynamics of Greed , 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 168, 177-78 (1984).  The “best interests” test differs
though, because on its face it seems fair.  See Elizabeth S. Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint
Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 478 (1984); see also Robert Cochran, The Search for Guidance in
Determining the Best Interests of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint Custody
Preferences, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1985).  Other authors demonstrating concern about strategic
behavior in child custody cases include Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language
and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 760-61 (1988), and Bartlett,
supra note 20, at 470.
29. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.02 cmt. b.
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with their children’s interests (perhaps more than men do),30 they are less likely
to do so at divorce when they act under stress31 and are generally engaged in
reclassifying property thought of as “ours” to “mine.”32  The Comments claim
that courts frequently choose “child interests” over parents33 (and sometimes, to
their credit, they do),34 but many cases and procedures seem not to.35  The
language of the Principles should help put this conflict to rest.  Specific sections,
such as section 2.08(b), which suggests that courts inform the parties about “the
impact of family dissolution on children and how the needs of children facing
family dissolution can best be addressed,”36 should go far to alleviating this
concern.
30. VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN’S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EMPLOYMENT 60 (1988).  See also Scott, Social
Norms, supra note 7, at 1951 (“Some feminists exalt the maternal role as central to women’s identity,
and for many women, child rearing is very rewarding.”).
31. This justifies state intrusion in the first place.  See Brinig, Troxel, supra note 11 (the state
should become involved only when parents are less apt to make decisions that are in the interests of
children).
32. Though many women report divorce as a cathartic experience, the catharsis itself is painful,
especially when the financial parts of the process seem (or actually are) unfair.  Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 28.
33. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.02(b), reporter’s notes at 30.
34. See, e.g., McCreery v. McCreery, 237 S.E.2d 167, 168 (Va. 1977) (the right of a parent to
custody of its minor child is subordinate to the right of a child to a custodial care of a parent).
35. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1953) (a custody decree concerns personal rights (of
the parents) at least as important as the property rights that undoubtedly require personal
jurisdiction); Bailey v. Bailey, 200 S.E. 622, 623 (Va. 1939); see Teacher’s Manual to SCHNEIDER &
BRINIG, supra note 3, at 3157-58, for a discussion of procedural protections in termination cases.  For
arguments that parental interests ought to be considered, especially since they are so often in line
with the child’s, see Scott Altman, Should Child Custody Rules Be Fair, 35 J. FAM. L. 325, 353 (1996-97);
Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16-21 (1987)
(arguing that it is unjust to parents to always put the child’s interests ahead of parent’s interests);
David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV.
477, 499 (1984) (“adult interests need not be ignored as a matter of first principle and probably
should not be as a matter of sensible policy so long as they can be kept subordinate to the interests of
children”).
For arguments that the law too often protects parental rights against the rights of children,
see generally Mary Ann Mason, The Custody Wars: Why Children are Losing the Legal Battle and
What We Can Do About It (1999); Mary Ann Mason, From Father’s Property to Children’s Rights:
the History of Child Custody in the United States (1994); Brinig & Buckley, supra note 9; Janet Leach
Richards, Redefining Parenthood: Parental Rights Versus Child Rights, 40 Wayne L. Rev. 1227 (1994);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg; A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14
Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce
and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. &  Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); Andrew Schepard, Taking Children
Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After Divorce, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 687 (1985).
36. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.08 cmt. a, reporter’s notes at 97.  About 15
jurisdictions require parents to attend a class or classes to teach them how to assist their children in
getting through the divorce process, or other form of counseling. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
46b-69b(b) (West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.21(2) (West 1994); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/404(a)- 750
(West 1999); IOWA CODE  § 598.19A (1996).  See generally Lynne M. Kenney & Diana Vigil, A Lawyer’s
Guide to Therapeutic Interventions in Domestic Relations Court, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629 (1996); Peter Salem,
Education for Divorcing Parents : A New Direction for Family Courts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 837 (1995);
Katherine M. Kitzman & Robert E. Emery, Child and Family Coping One Year After Mediated and
Litigated Child Custody Dispute, 8 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 150 (1994).  There are even some suggestions that
such programs may convince some parents not to divorce when they otherwise would.  See, e.g.,
William Doherty, How Therapists Harm Marriages and What We Can Do About It, J. OF COUPLES
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The third way in which Chapter Two reflects feminist principles is through
its delicate balance between a preference for agreements (allowing significant
autonomy for parents and their lawyers)37 without mandating mediation38 or
another form of alternative dispute resolution that some feminists find
troubling.39  Agreements are not only likely to be more successful over the long
run,40 but also promote consensus between the parties41 and discourage
litigation.42  Of course the more often the parties agree and settle their dispute,
the less often courts will hear family law cases.  The discretion and arbitrariness
of judges has less scope for operation.43  In fact, the entire Principles’ focus on
THERAPY (2000); William J. Doherty, I’m O.K., You’re O.K., But What About The Kids?, 17 THE FAM.
THERAPY NETWORKER 46 (Sept./Oct. 1993).
37. In Brinig, supra note 11, I argue that autonomy is necessary to promote “efficient”
families—ones in which children can flourish.  See also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as
Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995) (arguing that parental powers are given in advance to provide
appropriate incentives to otherwise uncompensated parents).
38. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.08 suggests in subsection 1(d) that that courts supply
parents information about “mediation or other non-judicial procedures designated to help them
achieve an agreement,” but cautions in subsection (2) that the court should not order services
requiring a parent to have face-to-face meetings with the other parent.  Such face-to-face meetings
are common in family mediation, although mediators may also use “shuttle diplomacy” plus private
meetings if the parties so request.  To meet the strongest objections against mediation, subsection (3)
suggests that a mediator  “should not conduct a mediation, even [with] parental consent, without
first screening for domestic abuse.”  In cases where there is credible evidence of domestic abuse, the
mediator should take steps to ensure the victim’s voluntary consent to mediate and to the agreement
reached, and to protect the victim’s safety.
39. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 22, at 1547; Laurie Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women’s
Progress on Family Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431, 435 (1985). See also Penelope E. Bryan,
Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation, and the Politics, of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992); Martha
Shaffer, Divorce Mediation: A Feminist Perspective, 46 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 162 (1988); Wanda A.
Wiegers, Economic Analysis of Law and Private Ordering: A Feminist Critique, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 170
(1992).  But see Joan Kelly, Mediated and Adversarial Divorce: Respondents’ Perceptions of Their Processes
and Outcomes, 24 MEDIATION Q. 71, 78 Tbl. I (1989).  The Principles reflect these concerns:
Notwithstanding its potential benefits, mediation poses some risks of coercion and
intimidation insofar as it enhances the opportunity for the stronger parent to exploit
vulnerabilities of the weaker one.  The risks are especially high when domestic abuse has
occurred or is occurring. . . .  Another concern is that the mediation process itself is said to
favor shared custodial and shared decisionmaking outcomes, which are not suitable for all
parents.
ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.08(b) cmt. at 94-95.
40. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Does Mediation Systematically Disadvantage Women?, 2 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1995); Carol Bohmer & Marilyn L. Ray, Effects of Different Dispute Resolution
Methods on Women and Children After Divorce, 28 FAM. L.Q. 223, 244 (Summer 1994); Richard D.
Mathis & Lynetlle C. Yingling, Analysis of Pre and Post Test Gender Differences in Family Satisfaction of
Divorce in Mediation Couples, 17 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 75 (1992).
41. Sally Burnett Sharp, Modification of Agreement-Based Custody Decrees: Unitary or Dual
Standard?, 68 VA. L. REV. 1263, 1280 (1982) (parental agreements help preserve at least a superficial
peace between parents and thereby facilitate an easier and more meaningful future relationship
between the child and the non-custodial parent).
42. See, e.g., ELEANOR M. MACCOBY & ROBERT MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND
LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992) (observing that in California custody cases, mandatory
mediation seems to have reduced litigation from ten percent of cases to less than two percent); see
also Emery et al., supra note 40 (fathers who mediated were likelier to meet their child-support
obligations than fathers who did not).
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written agreements, or “parenting plans” can be seen as an effort to reduce
discretion.44  In this light, the Principles can be seen as preferring consensus45 to
judicial decisionmaking, which is likely to be less flexible and more
dichotomous.  Structuring child custody to favor agreed-upon alternatives over
litigated outcomes also caters to what some believe is women’s greater aversion
to risk, especially when that risk involves their children.46
Feminist writers have a related concern that standards such as the best
interests and joint custody standards may each operate to allow strategic
43. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.07 requires a court to order an agreed-upon parenting
plan unless it makes specific findings that the agreement is not knowing or voluntary or the plan
would be harmful to the child.  Supporters of this type of private decisionmaking stress the role
deference plays in the informal incentive structure.  See Maccoby & Mnookin, supra note 42, at 41-42;
Carl E. Schneider, On the Duties and Rights of Parents, 81 VA. L. REV. 2477, 2485-86 (1995); Scott &
Scott, supra note 37, at 2456, 2463 (1995).  One state recently enacting parenting plan legislation is
Minnesota.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705 (West 2000).  For an enthusiastic student endorsement of
this legislation, see Theresa A. Peterson, Note, The State of Child Custody in Minnesota: Why Minnesota
Should Enact the Parenting Plan Legislation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1577 (1999).
44. Thomas J. Oldham, ALI Principles of Family Dissolution: Some Comments, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
801, 802 (1997) states:
This is a bold attempt by the ALI to set forth definite rules regarding the economic
consequences of marriage breakdown. Traditionally, family law rules have given judges
great discretion. Beginning less than two decades ago, judicial discretion when awarding
child support has been significantly limited via child support guidelines. In most states,
courts retain substantial discretion when determining how to divide the marital estate and
whether to award postdivorce spousal support. The ALI proposal breaks from this
tradition and attempts to largely eliminate judicial discretion.
For a discussion of the tradeoffs between discretions and rules in all divorce adjudication, see
Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases?  An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision
Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 411-26, 505-27 (1996).  For applications to custody specifically, see ALI
PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.02 and reporter’s notes at 32.  Bartlett writes:
It recognizes that determining the child’s best interests under a wide-open, subjective best-
interests standard leaves too much discretion to judges and their individual views about
childrearing and what is good for children, and in so doing, creates an unpredictability
that enhances conflict and harms children.  It recognizes, in short, that the best-interests
test is not best for children.
Bartlett, supra note 20, at 482 (writing about Chapter Two).  Mary Ann Glendon addresses the “best
interests” standard:
The ‘best interests’ standard is a primary example of the futility of attempting to achieve
perfect, individualized justice by reposing discretion in a judge. . . .  Its vagueness
provides maximum incentive to those who are inclined to wrangle over custody, and it
asks the judge to do what is almost impossible: evaluate the child-caring capacities of a
mother and a father at a time when family relations are apt to be most distorted by the
stress of separation and the divorce process itself.
Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60
TULANE L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1986); see also Mnookin, supra note 14.  But see Fineman, supra note 28;
Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules and Law, Child Custody and the UMDA’s Best Interest Standard, 89
MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2242-49 (1991).
45. Brinig, supra note 40, at 86 (citing Janet Moore, Covenant and Feminist Reconstructions of
Subjectivity within Theories of Justice, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 168 (1992); Marion Crane,
Feminism, Labor and Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1819, 1857 (1992)).  In terms of seeing law in “shades of
blues and greens” rather than black and white, see Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
46. See generally Brinig, supra note 40; Cochran, supra note 28; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra
note 28.
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bargaining.  Some fathers may ask for greater custody shares than they actually
want,47 under a “best interests test.”48  Others may use equal joint custody
presumptions to get out of paying substantial child support.49  The Principles
seek to minimize this strategic behavior.50
Another way in which Chapter Two reflects feminist concerns is in its
sensitivity toward domestic violence51 and the ways in which violence plays out
in child custody.52  I have already alluded to the feminist worries about
47. See Bartlett, supra note 20, at 470 (noting that her hypothetical David “may ask for primary
custody, even if he does not want it, to create some negotiating room”).
48. Maccoby and Mnookin found that 10% of fathers and 7% of mothers asked for more
physical custody than they actually wanted.  Twenty percent of fathers who wanted maternal
custody according to their interviews requested joint physical custody or father physical custody.  In
the unusual cases where mothers expressed a desire for joint physical custody in their interviews, a
third of them still requested sole maternal custody. Maccoby & Mnookin, supra note 42, at 100-03; see
also ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.02.
49. See, e.g., Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Supporting Children After Divorce: The Influence
Of Custody On Support Levels And Payments, 22 FAM. L.Q. 319, 321 (1988) (noting that for many
mothers, joint custody means the threat of potential loss of children to an all too frequently
uninvolved, abusive father who seeks to minimize his financial obligations and continue to exercise
control over his ex-wife through the children . . . .); Nancy Polikoff, Custody and Visitation: Their
Relationship to Establishing  and Enforcing Support, in 2 IMPROVING CHILD SUPPORT PRACTICE III-131
(Diane Dodson & Sherry Greendela Garza eds., 1985) (arguing that to avoid a custody contest or a
joint custody arrangement, many mothers accept a bargained-down property settlement or a
reduced or nonexistent child support award); see also Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent
Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed , 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 168, 177-78 (1984) (describing a
child support obligor, typically the father, who pays less support than is warranted by the children’s
needs and a wife who generally has a lower income or less earning power. The husband’s threats of
a custody fight become less successful, however, if the state has taken away the capacity of the
mother to bargain for custody in exchange for lower child support. Accordingly, joint custody
effectively results in lowering the father’s child support burden or eliminating it altogether.); Jana B.
Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497, 517 (1988) (“Legislation
skewed toward awards of joint custody increases the ability of the parent requesting joint custody to
engage in this type of extortion. David Chambers has noted that ‘a parent who is not really
interested in having joint custody may use the threat of demanding it as a tool to induce the other
parent to make concessions on issues of property division and child support.’”) (citing Chambers,
supra note 35, at 567).  Grillo, supra note 22, at 1596 (in Trina Grillo’s Linda and Jerry mediation in
California, Linda agreed to joint custody to avoid losing custody altogether).  Naomi Cahn writes
that joint custody gives a batterer additional power over his former spouse.  See Naomi R. Cahn,
Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of  Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 1041, 1058-59  (1991).
50. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1.
51. The Principles define domestic abuse as the infliction of physical injury, or of reasonable fear
of physical injury, by a present or former member of a child’s household against a child or another
member of the household.  The requirement that physical injury, or reasonable fear thereof, has been
inflicted is satisfied by proof of conviction for crimes [defined by the state].  Action taken by a
person for reasonable self-protection, or the protection of another person, is not domestic abuse.  Id.
§ 2.03(8).
52. See generally, Merle H. Weimer, Domestic Violence And Custody: Importing The American Law
Institute’s Principles Of The Law Of Family Dissolution Into Oregon Law, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 643
(1999).  As Weimer notes, the attention paid to domestic violence issues pervades the draft:
The other significant difference between the Oregon statute and the Principles relates to
the number of individual provisions that address domestic violence.  The Principles have
the advantage of being a well-integrated scheme, rather than a series of legislative
initiatives adopted over time.  As such, they address domestic violence in nearly every
provision.  An analysis of each provision that addresses domestic violence reveals that the
BRINIG - FMT.DOC 09/06/01  2:51 PM
310 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 8:301 2001
mediation in marriages in which violence is or was a factor.53  Section 2.13 poses
substantial obstacles for a parent obtaining custodial responsibility where
domestic violence occurred.54  When domestic abuse has been shown, “the court
should impose limits that are reasonably calculated to protect the child or child’s
parent from harm.”55  Since domestic violence seems to be far more a concern for
women than men,56 this concern is not surprising.
drafters of the Principles appear to have had three goals: (1) identifying all cases that
involve domestic abuse; (2) enhancing substantive justice in each case; and (3)
strengthening domestic violence victims’ safety during and after the legal proceedings.
Id. at 685. Courts are also urged to provide education on domestic violence and its impact on
children by ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1,  § 2.08(1)(c).
53. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 3131 (1994); MINN. STAT.
§ 518.17(2) (1998) (joint custody only); WIS. STAT. § 767.11(8)(b) (2000); Charlotte Germane et. al.,
Mandatory Custody Mediation and Joint Custody Orders in California: The Danger for Victims of Domestic
Violence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 175, 188 (1985); Lisa Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The
Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 71-100 (1984) (not
specifically custody cases).  As mentioned, § 2.08(3)(b) requires that the mediator “protect the safety
of the victim “in cases where there is credible evidence of domestic abuse.  ALI PRINCIPLES 1998,
supra note 1, § 2.08(3)(b).
Some studies estimate that over half the marriages ending in divorce involve some form of
violence.  See Linda Girdner, Custody Mediation in the United States: Empowerment or Social Control?, 3
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 134, 138 n.19 (1989) (reporting that a Canadian study shows physical violence
given as reason for marital separation by 50-75% of women).
54. Section 2.13 provides that the court shall limit or deny access and responsibility of a parent
otherwise allocated responsibility under a parenting plan to secure the safety and welfare of the
child or of a child’s parent, where it finds that interests of the child would be served by such limit or
denial, in light of credible evidence that the parent to be limited has “abused, neglected, or
abandoned a child, as defined by state law; has inflicted domestic abuse, or allowed another to inflict
domestic abuse, as defined in § 2.03(8).”  ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.13.
For a comprehensive examination of the state statutes currently mandating consideration of
violence, see generally Pauline Quirion, Protecting Children Exposed to Domestic Violence in Contested
Custody and Visitation Litigation, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 501 (1996); Family Violence Project, National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of
State Codes and Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q. 197 (1995).
55. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.13(2); see also Katherine M. Reihing, Protecting Victims
of Domestic Violence and Their Children After Divorce: The American Law Institute’s Model, 37 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 393 (1999).  Reihing notes that:
violence, focusing on the amelioration of the past effects of domestic violence and on
future protection and safety for both children and victims.  What is novel about the ALI
model is that it recognizes that abusers often use children to continue the abuse of their
victims.  Protection and safety of the abused parent is essential to achieving protection of
the welfare of the child.  Thus, when a parent is violent toward the other parent of a child,
special measures must be taken to protect the victims.
Id. at 398 (citing ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.13 cmt. c.).
56. Acting Bureau of Justice Statistics Director Lawrence A. Greenfeld stated that, “The number
of women attacked by spouses, former spouses, boyfriends, parents or children is more than 10
times higher than the number of males attacked by such people.”  However, husbands are convicted
more frequently than wives for killing their spouses, and wives more often were acting in self-
defense.  Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Fact Sheet, (October 11, 1995).  As Katharine
Bartlett noted:
Feminists also have linked family violence with women’s inequality and oppression.
Traditionally, the law has viewed violence in the family as a private issue, into which the
law should not intrude, for fear of exposing the family to ‘public curiosity and criticism’
and thus undermining it.  Feminists have shown that, to the extent family violence is
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In addition to specifying positive factors that a court may use in awarding
custodial responsibility, primary among which is the “approximation standard,”
the Principles include “prohibited factors” in section 2.14.  One of these is “the
parents’ relative earning capacities or financial circumstances.”  Were earning
capacities to be considered, men would be favored,57 since they, and especially
married men, tend to have earning capacities and financial situations58 that are
better than their former wives.  Yet the ALI, as well as a number of cases,59
suggests that this factor should not be taken into consideration.
A related concept appears in the ALI’s approximation standard itself.
Section 2.06 lists which functions are “caretaking functions,” and this will
operate to determine for which portion of time each parent should have
residential responsibility under section 2.09 (1).  These function generally
include “interaction with the child or decisionmaking on the child’s behalf.”60
On the other hand, parenting functions that will justify maintaining a
relationship with the child but not a large portion of residential placement61
include “parenting functions.”62
beyond the reach of the law, men’s abuse of and power over women is enabled and
affirmed.
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 494-95 (1999).
57. The connection between gender and relative wealth is pointed out by Dempsey v. Dempsey,
292 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Mich. App. 1980) (“In most cases the mother will be disadvantaged. . . . [T]he
danger in placing undue reliance on economic circumstances is its potential prejudicial effect upon
the dchild’s best interests.  The party with the more modest economic resources should not be
excluded from equal consideration as the custodial parent.”).
58. STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 66, 67-68 and 143 (Appendix A) (1999)(using the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth: 1979-93 and showing that the same married men earn $4260.85
more than before they were married, holding age constant).  PAULA ENGLAND & GEORGE FARKAS,
HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT AND GENDER (1986); see also Fuchs, supra note 30, at 60; Steven L. Nock,
Turn-Taking as Rational Behavior, 27 SOC. SCI. RES. 235, 243 (1999) (“Several decades of research have
shown, for example, that men are the greater beneficiaries of marriage than women.”).
While men’s financial situations improve, women’s income and hours of employment
decrease following marriage.  Fuchs, supra note 30, at 58; see also FRANCINE D. BLAU, MARIANNE A.
FERBER, & ANNE E. WINKLER, THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK at 95 & tbl.4.4 (1998).
This disparity is apt to continue following divorce.  See, e.g., Richard R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of
the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 528 (1996); Pamela J. Smock, Gender and the
Short-Run Economic Consequences of Marital Disruption, 73 SOC. FORCES 243 (1994); Ross Finnie,
Women, Men, and the Economic Consequences of Divorce: Evidence from Canadian Longitudinal Data, 30
CAN. REV. OF SOC. & ANTH. 205 (1993); Greg Duncan & Saul Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the
Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution, 22 DEMOG. 485 (1985).
59. Matter of Adoption of L., 462 N.E.2d 1165, 1170 (N.Y. 1984); Brooks v. Brooks, 466 A.2d 152,
156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (“[T]he sole permissible inquiry into the relative wealth of the parties is
whether either parent is unable to provide adequately for the child; unless the income of one party is
so inadequate as to preclude raising the children in a decent manner, the matter of relative income is
irrelevant.”).
60. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.06.  They include the tasks of: (a) meeting the “daily
physical needs of the child,” (b) direction of child’s developmental needs, (c) discipline and other
tasks attending to the child’s needs for behavioral control and self restraint; (d) arrangement of the
child’s education; (e) development and maintenance of appropriate interpersonal relationships; (f)
arrangement of health care; (g) moral guidance; and (h) arrangement and supervision of alternative
child care. Id.
61. Id. § 2.09(2).  In making residential provisions, the court shall give greatest weight to factor
(a) (caretaking functions) except that it shall allocate to a legal parent who has exercised a reasonable
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Among the prohibited factors is “the sexual conduct or sexual orientation
of a parent, except as necessary to protect a child from demonstrated harm.”63
While this rule would seem to be gender neutral, in fact it has operated in the
past to penalize women: since children lived with their mothers following the
parent’s divorce, the women could not have sexual relationships without
jeopardizing custody unless they remarried.  Their former husbands, who only
saw the children occasionally, could date  and have intimate conduct without
their children ever being aware of these adult relationships.64
Finally, the ALI attempts to resolve relocation questions in a way that will
benefit many women.  Relocation presents a “substantially changed
circumstance” justifying a change of custody only “when it significantly impairs
another parent’s ability to exercise responsibilities that parent has been
exercising under a parenting plan.”65  Even when this is shown, the court will
share of parenting functions for the child sufficient residential responsibility to satisfy factor (b)
(parenting functions).
62. Id. § 2.03(7).  These include:
(a) provision of economic support, (b) participation in decision-making regarding the
child’s welfare; (c) maintenance or improvement of the family residence, home or
furniture repair, home improvement projects, car repair and maintenance, yard work, and
house cleaning; and (d) financial planning and organization, food and clothing
purchasing, cleaning and maintenance of clothing, and other tasks supporting the
consumption and savings needs of the family.
Id.  In married couples, wives are more likely to provide the bulk of caretaking and parenting
functions. See, e.g., Cathleen D. Zick & Jennifer Geurer, Trends in Married Couples’ Time Use: Evidence
from 1977-78 and 1987-88, 24 SEX ROLES 459 (1991). Men are more likely to spend hours on provision
of economic support.  Further, men have seen provision for their families as an essential part of their
role as husbands and fathers.  See, e.g., Katharine Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family
Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 65, 101-10 (1998).  Fathers who seek custody argue that their work hours,
and especially overtime work, was done for the family and wasn’t something they would have
contemplated in the abstract.  They therefore find it difficult to swallow the idea, present in its most
vivid form in the “primary caretaker” and “approximation” custody rules, that time spent directly
with children is somehow qualitatively different from time spent working for them.  For example,
consider the portrayal of a father working overtime in ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND 177-83
(1997).
63. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.14(4).
64. For one state’s struggle with this problem, see Piatt v. Piatt, 499 S.E.2d 567 (Va. App. 1998)
(experimentation with sexual preference and promiscuity though the dissent noted both parents had
been promiscuous while still married); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (sexual
orientation); Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89 (Va. 1977) (sexual conduct); see also Petersen v. Petersen,
13 Va. Cir. 216 (1988) (the mother “dated” while still married and worked in a bar, while the father
of the nine year-old boy was stable, mature, and hardworking, and had “immediately accepted the
pleasures and responsibilities of fatherhood.”).  The most frequently cited case dealing with the
custodial parent’s morality is Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979); see also Rose v. Rose, 340
S.E.2d 176 (W. Va. 1985) (dissent) (where the father’s anger about the sexual relationship in question
seems to have been transmitted to the language used by the ten year-old son: “I don’t like Denver
and I don’t like what went on,” said the boy, who had only met Denver once, while viewing
fireworks); see also Murray v. Murray, 2000 WL 827960 (Ct. App. Tenn. 2000) (Mr. Murray strongly
objected to the fact that his former wife allowed Mr. Neiswinter to spend nights in her apartment
when the children were present and he asked the court to order her to “cease having men she is not
married to spending the night at her home in the presence of the children or, in the alternative, that
the children not be forced to spend the night in the home of their mother’s boyfriend or any other
man.”  The mother eventually married Mr. Neiswinter.).
65. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.20(1).
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normally “revise the parenting plan so as to both accommodate the relocation
and maintain the same proportion of residential responsibility being exercised
by each.”66  Most states currently have rules that either give the primary
custodial parent should have the benefit of a presumption allowing relocation
with the child,67 or place the burden should on that parent to show that a
relocation is in the child’s best interests. 68  Without picking either approach, the
Principles line up each parent’s burdens in accordance with past caretaking
patterns.  Thus, the primary caretaking parent is allowed to relocate with the
child if that parent has been exercising a significant majority of custodial
responsibility and intends to move for a legitimate reason to a location that is
reasonable in light of the purpose.69  Other relocation policies tend to penalize
mothers.70
IV.  OBSERVATIONS ON “SELLING” THE PRINCIPLES TO MEN
In order for the Principles to be adopted in states other than West Virginia,
legislators will need to be convinced that the change in standards will benefit
men as well as women.71  In talking to male legislators and interest groups and
66. Id. § 2.20(3).  This is quite different from the attitude of some states, who assume that
relocation that makes frequent visitation impractical justifies a change of custody. See, e.g., Carpenter
v. Carpenter, 257 S.E.2d 845 (Va. 1979) (mother sought to relocate from Tidewater, Virginia to New
York); Rowlee v. Rowlee, 179 S.E.2d 461 (Va. App. 1971) (holding that the failure to return a child to
the state may result in a loss of custody since the parent is not then a fit and proper person); DeCapri
v. DeCapri, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 36 (the mother moved to Cleveland to attend community college
resulting in a change from joint to sole custody in the father); cf. Bostick v. Bostick-Bennett, 478
S.E.2d 319 (Va. App. Ct. 1996) (the custodial father was not permitted to relocate to North Carolina).
67. This is the rule in California. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996), criticized
in Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children’s Best Interests in Relocation Cases: Burgess Revisited,
34 FAM. L.Q. 83 (2000)(contending for a case-by-case examination of relocation decisions).
68. Compare Carol S. Bruch & Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and Custodial
Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q. 245 (1996) (arguing that relocation rules should
give priority to the child’s relationship with the custodial parents) with Frank G. Adams, Child
Custody and Parent Relocations: Loving Your Children from a Distance, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 143 (1994)
(arguing that greater weight should be given to the importance of the noncustodial parent-child
relationship).
69. Bartlett, supra note 20, at 281-82.
70. Mothers may need to relocate to accept employment following divorce, especially if they
were not employed during the marriage.  They may also wish the support of friends or family from
whom they moved during the marriage because of their husband’s employment.  They may wish to
relocate because a of a second spouse’s job, and since his earning capacity will usually be greater
than hers, it may be rational to accommodate his employment.  See, e.g., Mary Ann Mason & Ann
Quirk, Are Mothers Losing Custody?  Read My Lips: Trends in Judicial Decision-Making in Custody
Disputes—1920, 1960, 1990, and 1995,  31 FAM. L.Q. 215, 224 (1997). Decisions about remaining in the
service or leaving it are influenced by potential implications for the wife, especially her earnings
capacity.  However, traditional men make career decisions without much concern for their wives.
Noncustodial parents (mostly fathers), are free to move for any reason since they have no custody to
lose. See H. Leroy Gill & Donald R. Haurin, Wherever He May Go: How Wives Affect Their Husband’s
Career Decisions, 27 SOC. SCI. RES. 264 (1998).
71. Men still make up the vast majority of legislators on the state level. In the United States
generally, women have been winning state legislative seats in increasing numbers, especially in the
last two decades. The number of female legislators increased five-fold between 1969 and 1996, from
4.0% in 1969, to 10.3% in 1979, to 14.7% in 1985, to 18.1% in 1991, and to 20.8% in 1996 (1541 female
legislators). However, there were considerable differences among the states.  Washington led the
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in receiving email messages from them, I have discovered that most favor joint
custody. Taking these men at their word, it may be that joint custody appeals
because it provides a solution where men do not have to be thought of as losing
custody.72  Some of the more thoughtful among them seem interested in
parenting plans,73 which could account for the increasing success of this
legislation.  While joint legal custody74 may have seemed to fill this function and
is the primary arrangement in many states,75 it has not resulted in the increased
child support or contact sought by its proponents.76  It also does not apparently
reduce the depression felt by noncustodial parents even beyond what they
would ordinarily feel upon divorce, as illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 (appended at
end of commentary).
As part of a larger project, Brinig and Nock77 examined the effect of loss of
physical custody on fathers’ mental states .78  The National Survey of Families
nation with a state legislature that was 39.5% female; then Nevada at 34.9%; Colorado at 31.0%; and
both Arizona and Vermont at  30.0%. In contrast, Alabama’s legislature then held the distinction
once held by Kentucky; it was just 3.6% female. The five states with the lowest percentages of
women state legislators in 1996 were Alabama (3.6%), Kentucky (8.0%), Oklahoma (10.7%),
Louisiana (11.1%), and Mississippi (11.5%), and three of the next five are also in the South, perhaps
reflecting this region’s traditional, conservative political culture.  In 1996, women hold 343, or 17.3%,
of the 1984 state Senate seats and 1198, or 22.0%, of the 5440 state House seats. See ROBERT DARCY ET
AL., WOMEN, ELECTIONS, AND REPRESENTATION 53-54 (2d ed. 1994); Women in Elective Office 1996,
available at Center for the American Woman and Politics, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers
University.
72. Men or women were apt to file for divorce if they obtained sole custody; women were only
slightly more likely to file than men if the custody award was joint. See Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas
W. Allen, “These Boots are Made for Walking: Why Most Divorce Filers are Women,” 2 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 126 (2000).
73. See, e.g., the Michigan legislation proposed by Dads, Inc.
74. This is called “decisionmaking responsibility” by the Principles.  See ALI PRINCIPLES 1998,
supra note 1, § 2.03 cmt. e (noting that it gives the parent “the authority to make significant decisions
delegated to parents as a matter of law, such as those relating to health care, education, permission
to marry at certain ages, or to enlist in the military”).
75. Margaret Brinig and Steven Nock found that about two-thirds of the custody arrangements
in the early 1990s contained provision for joint legal custody. Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, “I
Only Want Trust”: Norms, Trust, Autonomy and Community (Working Draft, University of Iowa, 2001)
(on file with the author).  For a listing of the statutes, see Margaret Martin Barry, The District of
Columbia’s Joint Custody Presumption: Misplaced Blame and Simplistic Solutions, 46 CATH. U.L. REV. 767,
774 (1997).
76. See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston et al., Does Joint Legal Custody Matter?, 2 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 167 (1990) (using the 1124 subjects in the Stanford Child Custody Study).  The authors noted
that proponents of joint legal custody argue that it strengthens the bond between nonresidential
fathers and their children, emphasizing fathers’ responsibilities and encouraging them to pay more
of the child support they owe: “[i]n some studies, fathers with joint legal custody show higher
compliance with support awards than fathers where the mother has sole legal custody.”  Id. at 169.
When they compared fathers’ involvement in everyday decisions between custody groups and
controlled for initial differences, “joint legal custody fathers were no more involved in everyday
decisions than mother legal custody fathers, and the only significant relation that emerged was a
negative one between mothers’ initial hostility and fathers’ involvement in such decisions. ”  Id. at
173.  Albiston et al., found that “joint legal custody fathers also were not more involved than mother
legal custody fathers in major decisions concerning their children.”  Id. at 174.  They also found that
“joint legal custody does not, in fact, improve fathers’ compliance with child support awards once
their ability to pay is taken into account.”  Id. at 176.
77. Brinig & Nock, supra note 75.
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and Households79 developed two waves of data, asking similar questions each
time.  Among these questions were several that make up the CESD-2,80 or brief
depression scale, which is used by psychiatrists to diagnose clinical depression.
The results shown in the tables are the most complicated equations we used in
each case.  Table 1 isolates some of the effects of divorce, loss of custody, and
legal loss of custody from other factors that also might affect depression:
depression at the time of the first interview, income, education, change of
income, remarriage, loss of a spouse through death.  To keep the sample as large
as possible, we began with all the men, married or single.  What we found was
that having a legal agreement or decree giving custody to the child’s mother is
not only statistically significant in predicting increased depression, but also has
one of the largest standard coefficients in the equation.  In practical terms, loss of
custody through a legal agreement or decision increases depression by about 4
points, or 1/4 of a standard deviation. Table 2 presents the same equation with
78. Id.  They examined mothers, too, but there were only twenty-three who lost custody during
this period, so though the direction and magnitude of the coefficients is the same as for men, the
results were not statistically significant.  It would be interesting, given the right data, to see if the
results hold out for women who were primary caretakers before separation and who are awarded
joint custody.  My guess is that they would be very nearly the same.
79. The National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) was first administered in 1987-88
and included personal interviews with 13,007 respondents from a national sample. The sample
includes a main cross-section of 9,637 households plus an oversampling of blacks, Puerto Ricans,
Mexican Americans, single-parent families, families with step-children, cohabiting couples and
recently married persons. One adult per household was randomly selected as the primary
respondent. Several portions of the main interview were self-administered to facilitate the collection
of sensitive information and to ease the flow of the interview. The average interview lasted one hour
and forty minutes.  We used questions asked of the male primary respondents. The NSFH was
administered by the Center for Demography and Ecology of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
80. Centers for Epidemological Studies Depression scale.  The questions on the survey are as
follows:
L12.  Now let’s think about you personally, here and now.  Here is a list of ways you
might have felt or behaved during the past week. Circle your answer to each question.
On how many days during the past week did you: Number of Days in Past Week
(L12a)  Feel bothered by things that usually don’t
bother you?
None  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
(L12b)  Not feel like eating (your appetite was
poor)?
None  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
(L12c)  Feel that you could not shake off the blues
even with help from your family or friends?
None  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
(L12d)  Have trouble keeping your mind on what
you were doing?
None  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
(L12e)  Feel depressed? None  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
(L12f)  Feel that everything you did was an effort? None  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
(L12g)  Feel fearful? None  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
(L12h)  Sleep restlessly? None  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
(L12i)  Talk less than usual? None  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
(L12j)  Feel lonely? None  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
(L12k)  Feel sad? None  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
(L12l)  Feel like you just could not get going? None  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
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the addition of a joint legal custody variable.  If the award of joint legal custody
relieved men’s depression, the coefficient would be negative.  Instead, it is
positive though not statistically significant.
Joint legal custody isn’t something that ultimately benefits noncustodial
parents, and we have seen that it doesn’t benefit children. Joint legal custody
isn’t something that custodial parents like either, since it restricts their
autonomy and independence.81  The Principles’ approximation rule would seem
to suggest happier results, both because some men would have a quantitatively
larger amount of time with their children,82 and because they would continue to
have the same proportion of time they spent prior to the separation.83  Neither
parent loses anything.
One question, and one that I have been asked by some fathers, is whether it
makes any difference what the default rule is, so long as it is known.  Though
many if not most couples would not prefer an equal joint custody arrangement,84
the reasoning is that they would bargain to what they did prefer.85  Most parents
81. Singer & Reynolds, supra note 49, at 508.
82. This is because section 2.09(1)(b) requires that each parent who fulfilled parenting functions
be allocated “the amount of residential time that will allow the child to maintain a meaningful
relationship with each parent,” no matter how small the actual quantity of caretaking functions he
performed.  See ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.09(1)(b).
83. ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, supra note 1, § 2.09(1)(each would have residential provisions
approximating “the caretaking functions each parent performed for the child before their
separation”).
Under an equal joint custody arrangement, women lose because men are unlikely to have
done half the caretaking prior to separation.  They feel that their prior sacrifices on behalf of their
children are discounted.  See Grillo, supra note 22.
84. When custody is contested, however, sole custody is awarded to the father in about 21% of
the cases, to the mother in 50% of the cases, and joint custody is nvertheless awarded in about 17% of
the cases.  Jed H. Abraham, Why Men Fight for Their Kids: How Bias in the System Puts Dads at a
Disadvantage, 17 FAM. ADVOC. 48 (Summer 1994).  About 75% of divorced couples receive joint legal
custody; only about 29% receive joint physical custody. See Steven J. Bahr et al., Trends in Child
Custody Awards: Has the Removal of Maternal Preference Made a Difference? 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 255 (1994)
(Utah study of 1087 couples, 1970-93); Gerald W. Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge’s
Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 201, 212-13 (1998):
Further, joint custody is a more expensive proposition than sole custody. Joint custodians
are each required to maintain suitable housing for children, with extra clothing and toys. It
has been estimated that these expenditures constitute from one-fourth to one-third of the
total child-related expenditures.  Initially, there is the question of whether the costs
associated with joint custody make such arrangements feasible for low-income families.
One study noted that joint custody is not spreading very quickly to lower socio-economic
populations.  Reviewing the literature, one is left with the feeling that joint custody is an
upper-middle class phenomenon.
85. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  For an example of how
this might work with joint custody:
There is some evidence that couples awarded joint custody settle into custody patterns not
unlike those under sole custody. However, the empirical  issue is by no means settled.
Moreover, as a theoretical matter, the Coasian  critique might fail in several ways. First,
even parents of ordinary delicacy might be unwilling to treat their children as fungible
with money in bargaining over custody. One reason for this is that the willingness to
“sell” one’s child might be taken as a signal of parental unfitness.
See Brinig & Buckley, supra note 9, at 400 (citing Maccoby & Mnookin, supra note 42, at 113-14, 225
(1992)); see also Albiston et al., supra note 77; Judith A. Seltzer, Legal Custody Arrangements and
Children’s Economic Welfare, 96 AM. J. SOC. 895, 900 (1991) (reporting few differences in physical-
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apparently eventually settle into something approaching their arrangements
before separation with the mother having the lion’s share of time with the child
in most cases.86  Giving a presumption in favor of a joint custodial arrangement
poses a number of problems, however.
The first is that law usually sets default provisions to what most parties
would want87 or to what will promote efficiency. 88 Joint custody (at least equal
sharing of time) is not what most people want.89  It is also not efficient, since in
custody arrangements, but lower child-support payments by noncustodial fathers).  Whatever the
custody award, in practice one parent, usually the mother, will have primary physical custody. See
MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 42; Judith A. Seltzer, Consequences of Marital Dissolution for
Children, 20 ANN. REV. SOC. 235 (1994); Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Trading at Divorce:
Preferences, Legal Rules and Transaction Costs, 8  J. DISP. RESOL. 279 (1993).
86. See, e.g., Carol Bohmer & Marilyn L. Ray, Effects of Different Dispute Resolution Methods on
Women and Children after Divorce, 28 FAM. L.Q. 223, 236 (1994) (finding that “[i]n Georgia, mothers
had responsibility for child caretaking, as represented by sole or residential custody in 75 percent of
cases, but mothers were found to be providing the day- to-day child caretaking in 84 percent of
cases”); see also Albiston et al., supra note 75 (Stanford Child Custody Study, finding only 20% had
joint physical custody).
87. Default rules are common in contractual settings.  In law and economics jargon, they at least
theoretically provide for what most parties would have agreed to under the given circumstances.
See, e.g., Russell Korobkin,  Inertia And Preference In Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of
Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); J.P. Kostritsky, “Why Infer”? What the New
Institutional Economics Has to Say About Law-Supplied Default Rules, 73 TUL. L. REV. 497 (1998); Morten
Hviid, Default Rules and Equilibrium Selection of Contract Terms, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 233 (1996);
Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE
L.J. 615 (1990); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps In Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
Of Default Rules 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the
Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989).  Even more relevant to this paper, fiduciary
duties can be seen as default rules.  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through
Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. Rev. 1627 (1999) (discussing elected officials and election law); Elizabeth S.
Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1250-51 (1998) (discussing
marriage); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules 74 OR. L. REV. 1209 (1995) (discussing
corporations).
88. Promotion of efficient outcomes, as opposed to what the parties most often want, is the
other justification commonly given for default rules.  See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule
Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389 (1993) (citing various kinds of
efficiency-producing norms); cf. Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy,
107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1820 (1998) (“Commercial law instead provides parties with default rules that, at
least in theory, direct the ex ante efficient result in standard cases.”).
The economic model of marriage, concluding that what should be maximized is “household
production,” or some combination of consumer goods and the leisure time within which to enjoy
them, is explained in relatively simple terms in Robert A. Moffitt, Female Wages, Male Wages, and the
Economic Model of Marriage: The Basic Evidence, in THE TIES THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE
AND COHABITATION 302, 303-06 (Linda J. Waite ed., 2000).  Much of the work on the economics of
households began with Gary S. Becker’s A Theory of Marriage: Part I, 81 J. POL. ECON. 813 (1973), and
A Theory of Marriage: Part II, 82 J. POL. ECON. S11 (1974); see also GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE
FAMILY (2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).  For a more recent argument, see LINDA J. WAITE &
MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER,
AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000).
89. Susan B. Steinman, et al., A Study of Parents Who Sought Joint Custody Following Divorce: Who
Reaches Agreement and Sustains Joint Custody and Who Returns to Court, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD
PSYCHIATRY 554 (1985).  A Massachusetts study of the records of 500 divorced families found that
only 10.1% of those families with joint legal custody also had joint physical custody.  See W.P.C.
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conflicted cases it can lead to far worse situations for children, because the
parties are apt to engage in strategic bargaining benefiting men at the expense of
women and children,90 and since it requires a change on the children’s part from
what they were used to.91
One way of evaluating what is efficient is to examine whether joint custody
awards are relitigated to the same extent as are sole custody awards.92  To the
Phear et al., An Empirical Study of Custody Arrangements: Joint Versus Sole Legal Custody, in JOINT
CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 142, 147 (Jay Folberg ed., 1984).
90. For example, fathers in joint custody arrangements pay approximately 14 percent of their
net income in contrast to sole custody fathers who are  required to pay 26 percent. See Singer &
Reynolds, supra note 49, at 514-15 (“The univariate tests of  significance revealed that although joint-
custody fathers’ and noncustodial fathers incomes were significantly different, the amount of their
child support payments was not.  The findings suggest that joint custody-fathers pay less child
support relative to their income than do noncustodial fathers.”).  Trina Grillo gives an example of a
mother who had been the primary custodian of the couple’s son and who was forced to accept a
joint custody arrangement because she would otherwise be viewed as an uncooperative parent by
the mediator.  Grillo, supra note 22, at 1594-95.  For this mother (and the child), joint custody
presented a diminution of their relationship quantitatively similar to that felt by many fathers who
in fact spend significant time with their children before separation and are relegated to “visitor”
status.  Also the rights of a child to his father and those of a father to his child are ignored or at least
subjugated to the perceived right of the other parent to total custody and control of the child’s life
and to the financial resources (alimony and child support payments, medical expenses, sometimes
mortgage payments) with which to implement and maintain same.  Fathers and their families are
not considered to be relevant now, except as sources of relief and help for women and “their”
families. Father’s families are deemed no longer to exist. They (fathers) will be “visitors” now.  See
Fay, supra note 17, at 412.
91. Instead of benefiting from joint custody, one study found a “substantial portion of [joint
custody] children were visibly distressed and confused.”  Marsha Kline et al., Children’s Adjustment
in Joint and Sole Physical Custody Families, 25 DEV. PSYCHOL. 430, 430 (1989).
92. Court-ordered joint custody in which one parent was forced to accept the arrangement had
relitigation rates comparable to those in sole custody.  See Frederic W. Ilfeld, Jr., et al., Does Joint
Custody Work? A First Look at Outcome Data of Relitigation, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62, 64-65 (1982).  In
another study, Steinman and colleagues found that parents whose joint custody arrangement was
court-ordered had the least successful relationships and were most likely to relitigate.  Steinman et
al., supra note 89.  A study of 500 family records by Phear and colleagues found the instances of
relitigation to be the same between joint and sole custody families.  See W.P.C. Phear et al., supra note
90 (noting that cooperation and lack of parental conflict are called the “primary” and “most
important” criteria for joint custody decisions.).  Without cooperation between the parents, joint
custody awards are “doomed to fail.” Singer & Reynolds, supra note 49, at fn. 35.  Many proponents
of joint custody assert, however, that it can be imposed in contested cases. The assumption is that the
entering of a joint custody order will lead to cooperation between parents.  Hardcastle, supra note 84,
at 214-15.  Moreover, in the only study which included a sample of joint custody  arrangements that
were ordered or strongly influenced by a court, none of the families with court-imposed or court-
influenced joint custody was found to  be ‘successful’ one year after the arrangement began.
Steinman, et al., supra note 89, at 558; see also DEBORAH A. LUEPNITZ, CHILD CUSTODY (1982); Susan
Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and the Judicial and Legislative
Implications, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 739 (1983); W. Glenn Clingempeel & N. Dickon Reppucci, Joint
Custody After Divorce: Major Issues and Goals for Research, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 102 (1982); Alice
Abarbanel, Shared Parenting After Separation and Divorce: A Study of Joint Custody, 49 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 320 (1979).  Further, “when joint custodians opt for additional litigation over
cooperation, a neverending custody struggle may ensue, even more bitterly contested than the
original custody question.”  Richard K. Schwartz, A New Role for the Guardian Ad Litem, 3  J. DISP.
RESOL. 117, 126 (1987).
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extent they are voluntary arrangements, as opposed to court-imposed ones, they
are not efficient.93  But an ultimately more satisfactory “efficiency,” given a
preference for children’s interests over parents’, is to look instead at which
regime is likely to promote the best outcomes as far as child well-being is
concerned.  I have argued elsewhere that child flourishing depends upon
parental autonomy94 and involvement of the community (though not as rights-
holders).95  Children do best when they, and their parents, see their relationships
as permanent.96  With enactment of Chapter Two, families are assured that they
will go on regardless of the disruption of the adult relationships.97  So no parent
loses,98 and children win.
Joint custody is particularly problematic when the marriage has experienced domestic
violence.  Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo and Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L & WOMEN’S
STUD. 133, 187 (1992).
93. The empirical problems here are considerable.  The couples who by themselves work out
joint custody arrangements are not demographically or attitudinally the same as those who contest
custody and who have already demonstrated animosity by litigating the original decision.  See Bahr
et al., supra note 84.
94. See Brinig, supra note 11; see also Scott & Scott, supra note 37.
95. Brinig, supra note 11.
96. Compare Margaret F. Brinig, The Family Franchise: Elderly Parents and Adult Siblings, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 393 with Nock, supra note 58, at 239-40 (1999) (arguing that obligations, such as debt
and promise, are the threads from which marital intimacy is woven).
97. Compare the argument that Martha Fineman makes in THE NEUTERED MOTHER (1995), with
that made in June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31 HOUS. L.
REV.359 (1994), and JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS (2000).  Fathers should be assured
that the continuity is not simply a financial one; see also Fay, supra note 17, at 412 (“Indeed, if anyone
even says ‘they’re his children, too,’ it is in the context of a discussion of his financial support
obligations. His nurturing/parenting abilities (present or potential) and his desires, not to mention
the desires and needs of his children for him are largely ignored.”).  But see Conway v. Conway, 395
S.E.2d 464 (Va. App. Ct. 1990) (though marriage ends at divorce for purposes of alimony, it
continues for purposes of child support so that the standard of living is not fixed at that enjoyed
during the marriage).  Compare Brinig & Buckley, supra note 9 (maintaining that joint custody gives
fathers incentives to form better relationships with children during marriage because the
relationships will not be disrupted after divorce); Brinig & Allen, supra note 72 (referring to the
approximation rule).
98. Of course any kind of parenting following dissolution will have its problems, even for
cooperative families.  We are not talking about a “first best” world here.  Just for starters, the time
shares each parent receives will not be shares of 100% of the child’s waking hours, since some of
these must be spent in transportation between parent’s homes.  The money the parents can spend on
child-related activities will decrease following separation because, just as with more traditional joint
custody, there will be a required duplication of physical equipment and a loss of “economies of
scale.”  See supra note 85 and accompanying text; BRINIG, supra note 27, at 188.  Over time, situations
will change, and families will become more complicated with the entry of stepparents.  See, e.g., E.
Mavis Hetherington & Kathleen M. Jodl, Stepfamilies as Settings for Child Development, in
STEPFAMILIES: WHO BENEFITS?  WHO DOES NOT? 55 (1994) (“Before the youngest child reaches the
age of 18, 40% of family members currently in a first marriage will eventually become members of a
stepfamily, with 86% of these stepfamilies composed of a biological mother and stepfather.”); see also
ALI PRINCIPLES 1998, § 2.20 cmt. a (noting that between 1985 and 1990 almost half the country
changed living quarters, and 20 percent of them (10% of the whole country) moved across state lines;
figures for families who have experienced divorce are higher).  It appears that 75% of custodial
mothers move at least once within four years of separation or divorce, and over half of them move
again.  Anne L. Spitzer, Moving and Storage of Postdivorce Children: Relocation, The Constitution and The
Courts, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 3.
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TABLE 1.  RISK OF FATHER’S DEPRESSION BASED UPON
CHILDREN’S LIVING ARRANGEMENT99
CEDS-2 is “Centers for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale”.
Averages for Married Respondents was 13.0843; Divorced was 18.07;
Separated was 22.73.  Respondents are compared to those who never married.
Data comes from the National Survey of Families and Households.
Variable Coefficient
(Error)
Standardized
Coefficient
(Beta)
T-statistic Significance
Model 4 (R2=.083)
Constant 13.409
(.949)
14.117 .000
Brief Depression scale
(first wave)
.240
(.018)
.221 13.487 .000
Any kids now living with other
parent?
.189
(1.516)
.002 .125 .901
Legal agreement giving custody to
other parent
4.256
(1.541)
.050 2.761 .006
Married for first time since first
wave, still married
-1.760
(1.743)
-.016 -1.009 .313
Remarried since first wave -2.341
(2.608)
-0.18 -.897 .370
Divorced since first wave 1.298
(1.799)
.016 .722 .471
Widowed since first wave 1.733
(2.732)
.010 .634 .526
Respondent total earnings -2.76E-05
(.000)
-.033 -1.744 .081
Best income measure wave 2 -4.14E-05
(.000)
-.071 -3.708 .000
Education Level -.123
(.058)
-.035 -2.106 .035
Black? 4.753
(.967)
.081 4.914 .000
Hispanic? 1.919
(1.377)
.023 1.394 .163
Asian? -2.519
(3.747)
-.011 -.672 .501
American Indian? .181
(5.196)
.001 .035 .972
99. Brinig & Nock, supra note 75, tbl.2.
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TABLE 2.  RISK OF MALE DEPRESSION BASED UPON
CHILD’S LIVING ARRANGEMENT AND LEGAL CUSTODY AWARD100
(204 out of 380 couples were awarded joint legal custody)
Variable Coefficient
(Error)
Standardized
Coefficient
(Beta)
T-statistic Significance
Model 4 (R2=.083)
Constant 13.381
(.950)
14.092
Brief Depression scale
(first wave)
.240
(.018)
.221 13.500 .000
Any kids now living with other
parent?
.110
(1.581)
.001 .072 .942
Legal agreement giving custody to
other parent
3.021
(1.839)
.036 1.643 .100
Is there joint legal custody? 2.661
(2.163)
.026 1.230 .219
Married for first time since first
wave, still married
-1.747
(1.743)
-.016 -1.002 .316
Remarried since first wave -2.181
(2.611)
-.013 -.835 .404
Divorced since first wave 1.034
(1.811)
.010 .571 .568
Widowed since first wave 1.749
(2.732)
-.033 .640 .522
Respondent total earnings -2.75E-05
(.000)
-.071 -1.736 .083
Best income measure wave 2 -4.14E-05
(.000)
-035 -3.713 .000
Education Level -.122
(.058)
.081 -2.097 .036
Black? 4.764
(.967)
.022 4.925 .000
Hispanic? 1.872
(1.377)
-.011 1.359 .174
Asian? -2.550
(3.746)
.000 -.681 .496
American Indian? .156
(5.195)
.030 .976
100. Id. tbl.3.
